Mercer Law Review
Volume 64
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 2

12-2012

Georgia's New Evidence Code: After the Celebration, a Serious
Review of Anticipated Subjects of Litigation to be Brought on by
the New Legislation
Matthew E. Cook
K. Todd Butler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Cook, Matthew E. and Butler, K. Todd (2012) "Georgia's New Evidence Code: After the Celebration, a
Serious Review of Anticipated Subjects of Litigation to be Brought on by the New Legislation," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 64 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol64/iss1/2

This Special Contribution is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Special Contribution

Georgia's New Evidence Code:
After the Celebration, a Serious
Review of Anticipated Subjects of
Litigation to be Brought on by the
New Legislation
by Matthew E. Cook*
and K. Todd Butler-*
As January 1, 2013 approaches, the Georgia Bar is anticipating the
new Georgia Evidence Code (GEC), House Bill 24,1 due to take effect on

* Partner in the firm of McDonald, Cody & Cook, LLP, Cornelia, Georgia. Piedmont
College (B.A., 1996); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., cum laude,
1999). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Principal in the firm of K. Todd Butler, P.C., Cairo, Georgia. The Florida State
University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1994); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University (J.D., cum laude, 1999). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess. (2011) [hereinafter "HB 24"] (codified as amended in
scattered sections of O.C.G.A tits. 24 to 35 (Supp. 2012)) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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that day.2 Several authors have canvassed the particular changes the
GEC brings to the existing Georgia Rules, of Evidence, as well as the
differences between the new GEC and the Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE). Those articles are commended for your reading, as they drive not
only lawyers' courtroom presentation but also their trial preparation.
Rather than rehashing the changes the GEC brings, this Article will
address the abbreviated history preceding the passage of House Bill 24
and the significant impact that some of those changes will have on cases
outside the courtroom.
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILL 24 AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
AND COMMON LAW ON THE NEW GEC

I.

The enactment of House Bill 24 (the Bill) is an obviously significant
event in Georgia legal history and worthy of acclaim. The FRE, the
organizational template for the new Code and the source text for the
language of the new GEC, has been in effect for over thirty years.' As
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the FRE has effectively
become the model code as most states adopted the FRE, in whole or part,
soon after Congress accepted the FRE for federal courts. 4 The Georgia
legislature unsuccessfully took measures to follow suit, but not until a
decade after the FRE were implemented in the federal courts, and not
until more than thirty other states had already done so.' Now, more
than two decades after the General Assembly's initial attempt and
failure to adopt the FRE, Georgia is finally joining the ranks of fortythree other states."
Legislative reviews written by students at the Georgia State University College of Law detail the political course of the Bill from the 20092010 session of the General Assembly, where it died on the Senate
floor,7 to the 2010-2011 session when, after being revived by Representative Wendell Willard, it passed in the House and was carried to the
Senate by Senator Bill Cowsert. 8

2. Id.
3.

28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006).

4. Paul S. Mih'ch, Georgia'sNew Evidence Code--An Overview, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
379, 380 (2011).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 380 n.6; David N. Dreyer, F. Beau Howard & Amy M. Leitch, Dancing with
the Big Boys: GeorgiaAdopts (most of the FederalRules of Evidence, 63 MERCER L. REV.
1, 2 n.3 (2011) (indicating that Massachusetts, for all practical purposes, also operates
under a form of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
7. Daniel Hendrix, Sofia Jeong & Warren Thomas, Legislative Review, Evidence, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010).
8. Robert Steele, Legislative Review, Evidence, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6, 10 (2011).
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During its time in the legislature, the Bill was threatened by
amendments introduced by,its own sponsor that appeared to be poison
pills intended to kill it.9 Nevertheless, the Senate finally debated the
Bill and voted 50-3 in its favor on April 14, 2011, the last day of the
legislative session.1" The 2011 Bill was "virtually identical" to the
failed 2010 Bill," with the only substantive change being an amendment to conform the GEC to the new language of FRE 804(b)(3)'s
"statement against interest rule," 2 revised pursuant to the Federal
Rules Enabling Act" and designated to take effect on December 1,
2010.14

With the new Code now a fait accompli, the Authors believe it is
important to reflect on the fact that this codification of Georgia evidence
law overcame not only a generation of lawyer-legislator resistance but
also was a significant event in the now centuries-long endeavor to codify
common law principles. The generation of resistance to the FRE in the
General Assembly, or as Professor Miich called it, the "long and winding
road" to the enactment of the FRE as Georgia's evidence law,'5 runs
straight through the heart of "codification" territory, a legal movement
that dominated
the attention of legal theorists in the nineteenth
6
century.

The enactment of the new GEC presents a prime opportunity for the
legal community to revisit the profound issues raised by the now-ancient
codification debate, and it is good to do so, as these questions strike at
the very heart of the social contract. 7 To adequately address these

9. But cf id. at 10, 11 n.76, 12 n.85 (Rep. Wendell Willard defending Sen. Bill Cowsert
against "poison pill" criticisms).
10. Id. at 10-12.
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id.
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2006).

14. Steele, supra note 8, at 14.
15. Milich, supra note 4, at 380.
16. See generally Lewis A.Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down:James Coolidge Carter
andthe AnticlassicalJurisprudenceofAnticodification, 19 YALE J.L. &HUMAN. 149 (2007);
Paul F. Kirgis, A LegisprudentialAnalysis of Evidence Codification: Why Most Rules of
Evidence Should Not be Codified-But PrivilegeLaw Should Be, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 809
(2004); Aniceto Masferrer, Defense of the Common Law Against Postbellum American
Codification:Reasonableand FallaciousArgumentation, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 355 (20082010); Mathias Reimann, The HistoricalSchool Against Codification:Savigny, Carter,and
the Defeat of the New York Civil Code, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 95 (1989); Catherine Skinner,
Codification and the Common Law, 11 EuR. J.L. REFORM 225 (2009); Gunther A. Weiss,
The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT L L. 435

(2000).
17. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 191 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651) ("Law
was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the naturall liberty of particular
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questions, however, one must first clarify what is meant by the term
"codification." The term has. fallen into casual usage, effectively gutting
its substantive or nomenclative significance. 8
Jeremy Bentham, a British utilitarian philosopher and legal theorist,
is perhaps better known today for his invention and promotion of the
Panopticon, a building design allowing for the unknown and constant
surveillance of all inhabitants, and the resulting implications for modern
surveilled society.19 But he also coined the term "codification" in his
June 1815 letter to Tsar Alexander 1.20 "Codification," when it is
properly used in the sense intended by Bentham, is "altogether different
...from.., ordinarylegislation" in which "business is... carried on in
the close mode."2 ' Bentham used the term codification to connote when
an "entire field . . . for ages has . . . lain covered with law [and] is to
receive an entire new covering all at once." 2 In an attempt to craft a
definition for the word, Catherine Skinner points out that "[clodification
is not a term of art in the common law vocabulary" 2 Skinner defines
"code"
as an instrument enacted by the legislature which forms the principal
source of law on a particular topic. It aims to codify all leading rules
derived from both judge-made and statutory law in a particular field
[Codification is the process of drafting and enacting such an
instrument.

men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together
against a common Enemy.").
18.

See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF

LEGAL TEXTS (2012). This publication, co-written by United States Supreme Court Justice
Scalia, roughly defines "code" as follows: "For ease of reference, legislatures often
consolidate their statutes at large into a code divided by topic-criminal law, court
jurisdiction, etc." and state and federal codifications dealing with particular areas of law
often contain a definition provision applicable to the entire codified field. Id. at 257.
Although the authors provide no definition for the term "code," their operative definition
can be discerned roughly as follows: A code is a legislative consolidation of statutes and
division of those statutes by topic, sometimes with a section that provides definitions for
terms used in the code that applies to the statutes collected under a particular topic. Id.
Scalia and Garner's usage does not comport with the ideal notion of a code, but their
operational definition is more or less consistent with what Weiss called an "administrative
index for legislation." Weiss, supra note 16, at 517.
19.

See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE

AND

PUNISH: THE BIRTH

OF THE

PRISON 200

(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (1975).
20. Weiss, supra note 16, at 448.
21.

JEREMY BENTHAM, WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, vol. IV, at 518 (Simplkin,

Marshall, & Co. 1843).
22. BENTHAM, supra note 21, at 518-19.
23. Skinner, supra note 16, at 228.
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A code... is distinct from an ordinary statute because it is designed
to be a comprehensive ano, coherent presentation of the law. Thus it
has an organizing and indexing role that an ordinary statute does not
share. A code is also intended to provide a framework for the law's
development
into the future, and is not a temporary legislative
24
measure.

Similarly, Gunther Weiss explored several definitions drawn from the
"Continental" experience, where the codification movement had much
greater success, and which more closely tracks Bentham's ideals.25
Acknowledging that a code may be "a book of law [that] claims to
regulate not only without contradiction but also exclusively and
26
completely the whole of the law or at least a comprehensive part of it,"
or "a regulation that is meant to be lasting, comprehensive, and
concluding, and that leaves no scope in adjudication for shaping the
law."27 Weiss settles on a working definition of the term that identifies
six core elements, one of which is expanded into three sub-elements.2"
Weiss argues that when scholars discuss codification, they are more or
less discussing the degree to which a code is: (1) authoritative; (2)
complete, in the sense that the code is (a) exclusive, (b) gapless, and (c)
comprehensive; (3) systematized; (4) effectuating at least some degree of
reform in both the form and substance of the law; (5) promotive of
national legal unification; and finally, (6) simple.2"
The element of authoritativeness speaks to the notion that a code is
positive law as opposed to "found" or natural law.3" The legislator, a
being "competent to make- law," affirmatively creates a code, the
authority of which is derived from the legislative power to create law,
and which therefore does not have to refer to other sources of law
external to itself."'
This goes hand-in-hand with the element of
completeness, the interweaving of the notions of an exclusive, gapless,
and comprehensive law.3 1 '"heideal was that the code could answer
all legal questions and that it would not be necessary to fall back on

24. Id.
25. Weiss, supra note 16, at 448-49.
26. Id. at 449 (alteration in original) (quoting MANFRED REBBINDER, EIN70HRUNG IN
DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 207 (1995)) (translation by author).
27. Id. (quoting FREDRICH KOBLER, OBER DIE PRAKTISCHEN AUFGABEN ZEITGEMABER
PRIvATRECHTSTHEoRIE 31 (1975)) (translation by author).
28. Id. at 454.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 456.
31. Id.; see also HOBBES, supra note 17, at 190.
32. Weiss, supra note 16, at 456, 458, 462.
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judges' opinions, customs, or scholarly wisdom."33 Ideally, the code
itself forbade judges from looking beyond the parameters of the code,
Weiss suggests
thus reducing them to "legal calculating machines."'
Continental
the
absolutist
to
appealing
that this element was especially
35
The final
centuries.
nineteenth
and
eighteenth
the
late
powers of
to this
relevance
have
minimal
unimportant,
four elements, though not
discussion.
With a clearer understanding of what codification means, we see the
issue is that codification, if properly understood, or at least on an ideal
level, stands in dichotomous opposition to the common law. A code is
positive law, created and imposed by the legislature upon the legal
community, which is bound by its own oath to the law to discern and
enforce the letter, meaning, and intent of this written rule, rather than
engage in the constant evolution of common law, which is derived from
the ever-evolving analysis of accumulated precedent.38
Bentham was a major proponent of codification in the early nineteenth
3
Bentcentury in England, on the Continent, and in the AmericasY.
ham's hubris in his advocacy for codification seems to have known no
bounds. In an October 1811 letter to President James Madison,
Bentham offered to write a unifying and authoritative code for the
United States that would be "very short and simple, that it would be
unnecessary from then on to have any other law books except [the] code,
and that the entire legal profession could safely be abolished since, to
quote [Bentham's] own language, 'seldom would there be any such thing
as a question of law.'"3" Bentham's clear hostility to the common law
is palpable. Referring to it as "unwritten . . . but much more properly
...
uncomposed and unenacted law,"39 Bentham wrote:
this impostrous law ... the perpetual fruits, are-in the civil or nonpenal branch ... uncertainty, uncognoscibility,particulardisappointments, without end, general sense of insecurity against similar disappointment and loss; [and]-in the penal branch, uncertainty and

uncognoscibility,as before; and, instead of compliance and obedience,
the evil of transgression, mixed with the evil of punishment:-in both

branches, in the breast and in the hands of the judge, power every-

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 456.
Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 452.
See supra notes 16-27.
Marion Smith, The FirstCodification of the Substantive Common Law, 4 TUL. L.

REV. 178, 180-81 (1929-1930); Weiss, supra note 16, at 475.
38. Smith, supra note 37, at 181 (quoting BENTHAM, supra note 21, at 453).
39. BENTHAM, supra note 21, at 460.
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where arbitrary, with the semblance of a set of rules to serve as a
screen to it.40
It is obvious Bentham's dislike for common law was directly correlated
with the problems he perceived in the judiciary. His quarrel with the
common law rules of evidence is particularly instructive. Writing that
"the customary exclusionary rules... are not, in the law of any country,
either consisteht with one another, or adhered to with any tolerable
degree of constancy," he proposed to remedy the problem with "[ilnstructions... from the legislatorto the judge"that point out the characteristics of an item of evidence that would subject it to exclusion, and with
the words "absolute and inexorable [exclusion]," indicated that he would
allow the judiciary no discretion whatsoever in making evidentiary
decisions.4
Over the course of the twentieth century, the American legal
landscape transformed from "a legal system dominated by the common
law, divined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures,
'
have become the primary source of law." However, lawyers practicing
in such an "Age of Statutes" understand the fallacy of Bentham's
repeated and strident assurances of codified law's "simplification" of
human disputes. Not only is Bentham's dream of an incorruptible
codified law that needs no external interpretation pragmatically
infeasible, but such a concept runs roughshod over the American
principle of separation of powers, especially in the context of a trial
court's evidentiary rulings.4 3
Frustration with some of the more persistent shortcomings of common
law, however, was not isolated to social and political reformers like
Bentham. Professor Thomas F. Green, Jr., a key player in the development of the FRE, identifies Joseph Henry Lumpkin, the first justice of

40. Id.
41. Id. at 465. Bentham's complaints about the arbitrary application of common law
principles and proposed solution are somewhat reminiscent of Henry Irs attempts to regain
secular control of the English judiciary from ecclesiastical courts. See Constitutions of
Clarendon (1164), availableat http://avaln.law.yale.edu/medieval/constcla.asp.
42. GuImo CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. 1999) (1982).
43. See Mason v. Home Depot U.SA, Inc., 283 Ga. 271, 276. 658 S.E.2d 603, 608
(2008). Professor Milich referenced Mason in his remarks to the Judiciary Committee on
March 9, 2010. Video: GeorgiaHouse ofRepresentatives JudiciaryCommittee Proceedings
(Mar. 9, 2010), 7m30s, bttp://media.legis.ga.gov/hav/09_10/2010/committees/judi/judi030
910EDITED.wmv. He pointed out that care was taken in drafting the new evidence code,
and its preamble, to avoid the separation of powers issue that the court considered in
Mason. The language of the preamble is advisory, or preparatory, rather than mandatory.
This probably resolves the concerns expressed by Dreyer et al., supra note 6, at 17-19.
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the Georgia Supreme Court, as voicing concerns not so dissimilar from
those of Bentham's about the effect of common law on evidentiary
issues." Reviewing a trial court's decision to admit an item of evidence
that might have been excluded under a stricter application of evidence
law, Justice Lumpkin wrote that "[tiruth, common sense, and enlightened reason, alike demand the abolition of all those artificial rules which
shut out any fact from the jury, however remotely relevant, or from
whatever source derived, which would assist them in coming to a
satisfactory verdict." In 1847, Justice Lumpkin, along with the two
other justices, served on the committee that made recommendations to
the Georgia General Assembly, which ultimately led to Georgia becoming
one of the first states to adopt a comprehensive code that included
procedural, evidentiary, penal, and civil law.'
The adoption of the new GEC has been extolled as the eradication of
all ambiguities in evidentiary matters through the collection, conformation, and modernization of the evidence rules. An often-cited example
of this purported restoration of logic to the evidence code is the
replacement of Georgia's traditional res gestae exception with three new
rules that will, according to proponents, address more concretely the
admissibility of such evidence. 4' But, given the historical failure to yet
master human nature through the imposition of legal devices, one must
ask whether the new GEC will in fact simplify the practice of law in
Georgia, or merely create an exponentially expanded body of Georgia
case law, the creation and knowledge of which practitioners and judges
will be charged with making. In other words, the admission of evidence
must always be based on the context of the case and the discretion of the
trial court, regardless of whether the rule of law is derived from a
uniform code or naturally-evolved common law.
This conclusion comports with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s belief in
the common law. According to Holmes, any codification is just a
beginning of a new development of law: "However much we may codify
the law into a series of seemingly self-sufficient propositions, those
propositions will be but a phase in a continuous growth."4 8 Rather
than rigidly applying a written rule for the sake of legal purity, Holmes
believed a learned jurist discerns the law based on

44. Thomas F. Green, Jr., Highlightsof the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence, 4 GA.
L. REV. 1, 1(1969-1970).
45. Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 14 Ga. 55, 62 (1853) (misquoted in original)).
46. Erwin C. Surrency, The Georgia Code of 1863 and Its Place in the Codification
Movement, 11 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 81, 87(2003).
47. See Milich, supra note 4, at 392-94.
48. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 37 (1881).
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[tihe felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, [and who is aware
that these] have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law
embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries,
and it cannot be dealt with asr if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics.49
Holmes also did not adhere to rigid notions of interpreting the common
law:
[Jiust as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some
earlier creature to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive
in the law long after the use they once served is at an end and the
reason for them has been forgotten. The result of following them must
often be failure and confusion from the merely logical point of view.
On the other hand, in substance the growth of the law is legislative.
And this in a deeper sense than that what the courts declare to have
always been the law is in fact new. It is legislative in its grounds. The
very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with
an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices
of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned. Every important principle which is developed
by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less
definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be sure,
under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive
preferences and inarticulate convictions, but [nonetheless] traceable to
views of public policy in the last analysis. And as the law is administered by able and experienced men, who know too much to sacrifice
good sense to a syllogism, it will be found that, when ancient rules
maintain themselves in the way that has been and will be shown in
this book, new reasons more fitted to the time have been found for
them, and that they gradually receive a new content, and at last a new
form, from the grounds to which they have been transplanted."0
Like the FRE, which was itself "born in controversy,"5 ' the new GEC
is no different. Although the GEC may bring more long-term uniformity
between Georgia and federal evidence law, it will likely bring a great
deal of short-term uncertainty. The General Assembly's adoption of a

49. Id. at 1.
50. Id. at 35-36.
51. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand Theories of Statutory
Construction:A "Bottom Up" InterpretiveApproach to the FederalRules of Evidence, 75 OR.
L. REV. 389, 389 (1996).
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"tweaked" version of the FRE, which retains many of Georgia's existing
evidence statutes, has resulted in a new GEC that contains nearly twice
as many evidence rules as the FRE.5" Also, as with Georgia's adoption
of certain federal civil procedure rules, such as Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23's incorporation into section 9-11-23 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 53 all pertinent federal case law will soon
be citable authority within Georgia for any portion of the new GEC
substantially derived from the FRE.54 The Authors suggest that the
only workable construct for tackling both substantive statutory changes
and a sudden influx of interpretive authority is for Georgia courts and
practitioners to strive to emulate Holmes's ideals while remaining keenly
aware of Bentham's fears.
II.

PRACTICE CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE NEW GEORGIA
EVIDENCE CODE

The coming changes in Georgia evidence law have been discussed at
length elsewhere. Georgia State University Law Professor Paul S.
Milich discusses significant changes that the new GEC makes in
Georgia's substantive evidence law,55 while notable differences between
the GEC and the FRE have been addressed as well,56 Knowing that
the GEC cannot seamlessly take effect, and knowing that it will not
displace the importance of a trial court's discretion, the Authors turn
briefly to address issues that the GEC presents for lawyers in the
discovery phase and in preparation of cases.
A

CredibilityAttacked by Specific Instances of PriorConduct

Unless quickly and carefully defined, one of the most sweeping
changes brought by the GEC will be its approach to impeachment
evidence, which could itself alone multiply litigation exponentially.
Under Georgia's prior evidentiary code, a witness could not be "impeached by [prior] instances of specific misconduct unless that misconduct has resulted in the conviction of a crime." 7 However, the new

52. Dreyer et al., supra note 6, at 19, 21.
53. Compare O.C.G. § 9-11-23 (2006) with FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
54. See HB 24 (noting that the General Assembly considered the FRE as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts of Appeals). While not
codified, the Authors assure that the adoption of the FRE will work a hardship on smaller
law firms that previously had not subscribed to a "national" Westlaw or Lexis plan.
55. Milich, supra note 4, at 387-419; see also Dreyer et al., supra note 6, at 19-25.
56. See Dreyer et al., supra note 6, at 26-45.
57. Colzie v. State, 289 Ga. 120, 123, 710 S.E.2d 115, 119 (2011) (quoting McClure v.
State, 278 Ga. 411, 412, 603 S.E.2d 224, 227 (2004)).
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GEC specifically permits impeachment of witnesses, in the discretion of
the trial court, by inquiry into specific instances of misconduct where
those instances demonstrate untruthfulness.5 8
Because Georgia's Civil Practice Act5 9 permits discovery of any
matter "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,"60 volumes of discovery, endless hours of depositions, and a
barrage of books will be filled with arguments regarding prior "bad" acts
of parties and witnesses. Opposing lawyers will inquire of every
instance where some prior transaction could be spun as dishonest, even
if not germane to the case at bar. For example, even in the most simple
of personal injury cases, counsel should prepare for discovery seeking the
names of every acquaintance of their client, or answering interrogatories
that ask for the disclosure of every act, or any person aware of any act,
demonstrating the client's untruthfulness, or the untruthfulness of any
other witness in the case. Opposing lawyers serving such discovery will
argue that the same must be answered because it may reveal the name
of someone who knows the opposing party and could provide testimony
regarding prior acts of untruthfulness. Witnesses will be subjected to
deposition questions regarding their intimate and personal life histories,
the names of their former spouses, the circumstances of an old divorce,
the legitimacy of their tax payment history, or any prior disputes with
neighbors, even if their only connection to the litigation was that of a
bystander at the scene of a slip and fall.
Whether trial courts will constrain parties who aggressively seek
discovery regarding prior bad acts remains to be seen. Certainly, trial
judges retain the authority to control discovery and protect parties and
witnesses from "harassment" and "oppression," but with the new GEC,
foreclosing such discovery may risk reversal on appeal. It is possible
that after a few years, this provision of the GEC will be reigned in by
our appellate courts or the legislature so as to make discovery and
litigation manageable.
B. Business Records Exception
With the adoption of O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6),61 another monumental

change in the way personal injury cases are prepared has arrived.
Under prior Georgia law, opinions and conclusions in medical records
were inadmissible unless the person making the declaration was present

58. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-608(b) (Supp. 2012).

59. O.C.G.A. tit. 9, ch. 11 (2006).
60. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(b)(1) (2006).
61. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6) (Supp. 2012).
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in court.6 2 That rule prevented counsel from using a statement in a
medical record out of context. 3 For example, frequently, a statement
that is not fully explained, or which may have been placed mistakenly,
will make its way into a provider's medical record. To gain an advantage, counsel may be tempted to use such a statement, knowing that as
long as the original author of the statement is not present to testify
regarding the record, an argument could be made to the jury that the
statement means something it may not. Under the old law, that
gamesmanship was precluded with good reason-to prevent juries from
reaching decisions about medical and scientific issues based upon
medical records explained by lawyers and not doctors."
The new GEC departs from this safeguard and expressly permits
"opinions" and "diagnoses" from any profession to be admitted at trial
upon proper certification of the medical record and notice to the opposing
party.65 This single change will increase litigation because, now, the

practical burden of combating the misuse of medical records will fall to
the aggrieved party to chase down the author of each stray comment and
incur the expense of calling such person as a witness at trial. Further,

62. Nichols v. State, 278 Ga. App. 46, 49, 628 S.E.2d 131, 134 (2006) ("Diagnostic
opinions and conclusions contained in medical records are generally inadmissible as
hearsay unless the person who made them testifies as to their factual basis."). See also
Cannon v. Jeffries, 250 Ga. App. 371, 375, 551 S.E.2d 777, 781 (2001) ("[hf a hospital
record contains diagnostic opinions and conclusions, it cannot, upon proper objection, be
admitted into evidence unless and until the proper foundation islald, i.e., the person who
entered such diagnostic opinions and conclusions upon the record must qualify as an expert
and relate the facts upon which the entry was based.") (alteration in original) (quoting
Stoneridge Properties, Inc. v. Kuper, 178 Ga. App. 409, 412, 343 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1986)).
63. 250 Ga. App. at 375, 551 S.E.2d at 780-81.
64. The Authors recently handled a personal injury case where the plaintiff had
suffered a back injury in 1980 to an intervetebral disc at L3-4. Some twenty-five years
later, the client suffered an intervetebral disc injury at L5-S1. Even though the current
treating physicians testified the old back injury was at a different level and had "absolutely
nothing to do with the current injury," opposing counsel sought to use the records from the
1980 injury. The argument was essentially that a "back injury was a back injury" and thus
the jury should be presented with such evidence. The trial court excluded the evidence
recognizing the danger of inviting the jury to reach medical conclusions devoid of any
medical evidence and based solely on the arguments of lawyers. Potts v. YRC, Inc. No.
2008EV006225H (Fulton Cnty. State Ct., settled Aug. 2012). The wisdom of that decision
is ignored by the new GEC.
65. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6). Counsel should insist that opposing counsel identify with
specificity which statements and records they intend to introduce under O.C.G. § 24-8803(6) and not permit a general notice to "use any and all medical records." Allowing such
"notices" to stand unrefined will result in a significant disadvantage to meet any out-ofcourt statements at trial.
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even if the declarant is deceased and cannot be questioned regarding the
statement, the new GEC will apparently admit the record.6
C. Juror Testimony Regarding "ExtraneousEvidence"
The new GEC liberalizes the rule for impeaching a jury verdict, which
could quickly turn into an additional source of appeals for civil jury
verdicts. Per O.C.G.A. § 24-6-606(b), 7 the new GEC will permit a juror
to testify concerning "whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the juror's attention."8 Practioners and courts
should prepare for the intense assault ofjurors following verdicts by the
losing party seeking reversal of any verdict. Any juror who can be
persuaded will be asked to give testimony that other jurors discussed
"extraneous prejudicial information" during deliberations, and that
information will be argued to be "inadmissible" evidence.
These three provisions in the new GEC underscore the need for our
judges and justices to be vigilant in examining evidentiary issues and
using their discretion to be sure that our laws and litigation achieve
their lofty purpose of resolving disputes with truth, all the while
protecting litigants from abuse.
III.

CONCLUSION

The ramifications of the new GEC are multi-faceted. Certain "growing
pains" will undoubtedly occur while initially implementing the new GEC
and its accompanying federal interpretive authority into the Georgia
courts. However, Georgia courts will continue to have a profound impact
on Georgia's evidentiary law and may significantly ease this process
through measured, thorough, and thoughtful opinions.

66. See id. (lacking any provision that would exclude statements by deceased
declarants).
67. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-606(b) (Supp. 2012).
68. Id.

